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Abstract

Intoxicated driving claims more than 10,000 lives per year. In
efforts to combat this devastating statistic, states have enacted laws
that permit law enforcement officers to order warrantless blood
draws from suspects of driving under the influence. In doing so, law
enforcement officers seek the assistance of medical personnel to
carry out the phlebotomy process. While medical personnel are
obliged to assist law enforcement with their investigations, they
also have an ethical duty to their patient and a legal duty to comply
with the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996. What are the legal implications when the suspect becomes the
patient? Oftentimes, medical personnel are left struggling to
determine how to appropriately respond to law enforcement officers’
requests for blood draws where there is no court order or warrant.
Such requests can trigger a wide range of compliance issues. What
is the interest that prevails? Is it the privacy interests of the
individual as a patient; the interests of healthcare providers in
protecting the privacy of patients in their health records; or the
interests of the state to deter intoxicated driving? This comment
surveys current federal regulation, recent Supreme Court
Jurisprudence and state law as it relates to this nexus of patient
care and law enforcement.

I.

INTRODUCTION

A. “Stop!” “I’ve done nothing wrong!”1
On a warm summer day in Salt Lake City, Utah, the head
nurse at the University of Utah Hospital’s burn unit, Alex Wubbles,
was approached by a police officer who demanded she draw blood
on an unconscious patient without the officer first presenting a
warrant.2 She calmly printed the hospital’s policy on providing law

1. See Derek Hawkins & Amy B. Wang, A Utah Nurse’s Violent Arrest Puts
Patient-Consent Law — and Police Conduct — in the Spotlight, WASH. POST
(Sept. 03, 2017), www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2017/09/03/
a-utah-nurses-violent-arrest-puts-patient-consent-law-and-police-conduct-inthe-spotlight/?utm_term=.dc5dcb5c0783 (commenting on the videotaped arrest
of a nurse at a Salt Lake City hospital after she told police that they weren’t
allowed to draw blood from an unconscious patient).
2. Id.
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enforcement with blood test results for patients suspected to be
under the influence.3 She informed the officer that his request could
not be fulfilled without an electronic warrant, patient consent or
court order.4 When the officer continued to demand the blood draw,
she refused.5 She stated that because the patient was unconscious,
she could not give consent on his behalf. 6 The officer then violently
moved toward her and dragged her out of the hospital while putting
cuffs on her and placing her under arrest.7
The Fourth Amendment protects individuals against
unreasonable searches.8 The Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (hereinafter “HIPAA” or “the act”)
protects the privacy of patient information as it is maintained and
disclosed by covered health care entities. 9 Implied-consent laws are
statutes imposed by state legislatures to combat the detrimental
effects of drunk driving.10 But what happens when the suspect of
intoxicated driving is taken to the hospital and becomes the patient
of a healthcare entity? Oftentimes, medical entities are left
struggling to determine how to appropriately respond to law
enforcement officers’ requests for blood draws where there is no
court order or warrant. Such requests can trigger a wide range of
compliance issues, such as patient privacy and consent
requirements, particularly when a medical entity’s compliance with
HIPAA provisions directly conflicts with law enforcement needs and
goals.11 What is the interest that prevails? Is it the privacy interests
of the individual as a patient; the interests of healthcare providers
in protecting the privacy of patients in their health records; or the
interests of the state to deter intoxicated driving?
This comment surveys three areas of law that are implicated
when law enforcement requests medical personnel to conduct blood
draws and disclose blood alcohol results: Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence, state statutes and implied-consent laws, and
3. Fred Barbash & Derek Hawkins, Utah Hospital Imposes New Policy in
Response to Nurse's Manhandling and Arrest, WASH. POST (Sept. 05, 2017),
www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/ct-utah-nurse-arrest-policychange-20170905-story.html.
4. Id.
5. Hawkins & Wang, supra note 1.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
9. 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 59919 (1999).
10. See generally JAMES B. JACOBS, DRUNK DRIVING: AN AMERICAN
DILEMMA (STUDIES IN CRIME AND JUSTICE) (Sanford H. Kadish et al. eds., 1st
ed. 2013) (providing a comprehensive review and analysis of America's drunk
driving problem and of America's anti-drunk driving policies and
jurisprudence).
11. Anne M. Brendel & Suzanne Cate Jones, Law Enforcement and
Healthcare: When Consent, Privacy, and Safety Collide, Lexology (Feb. 1, 2018),
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=b5bf9438-9898-4b61-9435-14c
139097581.
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HIPAA. It will explore the ethical and legal issues that medical
personnel and law officers alike are confronted with in the matter
of blood draws authorized for law enforcement purposes.
Section I will first discuss Supreme Court jurisprudence on
warrantless blood draws. Next, it will survey state laws
implemented to deter intoxicated driving as a result of the Supreme
Court’s findings. Finally, it will discuss HIPAA and its purposes in
protecting the privacy of individually identifiable health
information and how its provisions affect state law. Section II will
address the issues that arise when applying HIPAA’s preemption
provision to state law. Section III will offer several proposals on this
nexus of patient care and law enforcement by recommending how
HIPAA should be construed and implemented in order to
sufficiently satisfy the interests of law enforcement in their public
duty to deter drunk driving, patients in their privacy, and medical
personnel in their ethical duty.

II. BACKGROUND
A. Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Warrantless
Bodily Extractions
The Fourth Amendment expressly provides, “[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by
Oath or affirmation.”12
The Supreme Court has established through Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence that it is the role of the judiciary to
“assur[e] preservation of that degree of privacy against government
that existed when the Fourth Amendment was adopted.”13 Initially,
the Fourth Amendment was interpreted to encompass a concern for
government trespass upon property or tangible persons, papers, and
effects of the individual.14 However in Katz v. United States, the
Supreme Court expressly extended the reach of Fourth Amendment
protections by rejecting the argument that a "search" can occur only
when there has been a "physical intrusion" into a "constitutionally
protected area," noting that the Fourth Amendment "protects
people, not places."15 There, the Court articulated a two-part
12. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
13. United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 406 (2012) (citing Kyllo v. United
States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001)) (internal citations omitted).
14. See Olmstead v. United States, 227 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that
warrantless wiretapping of an individual’s home phone did not amount to a
Fourth Amendment violation because there was no physical trespass into the
home of the individual).
15. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-53 (1967) (holding that a
search was unconstitutional where government agents attached an electronic
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standard to evaluate whether an individual has a reasonable
expectation of privacy in the object of the search. 16 First, the
individual asserting it must manifest “a subjective expectation of
privacy in the object of the challenged search," and second, "society
must be willing to recognize that expectation as reasonable." 17 As
such, “[w]hen an expectation of privacy [satisfies] both of these
requirements, government action that ‘invade[s]’ the expectation
normally counts as a search.”18 Following this line of reasoning, the
Supreme Court has recognized, “that a ‘compelled intrusio[n] into
the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content must be deemed
a Fourth Amendment search.”19
Supreme Court case law governing searches involving the
extraction of evidence from within the body is rather scarce and the
standards for evaluating such extractions have changed
significantly over the past seventy years. Prior to 1961, the Fourth
Amendment was not incorporated against the states. 20 As such,
defendants challenged bodily extractions authorized by law
enforcement under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.21 Supreme Court cases governing bodily extractions
prior to the incorporation of the Fourth Amendment against the
states are derived from Rochin v. California22 and Breithaupt v.
Abram.23 After the Fourth Amendment was incorporated, the
Supreme Court addressed blood draws for drivers suspected of
intoxicated driving in California v. Schmerber 24 and carved out a
per se exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement
based on the dissipation of alcohol in the blood stream. After the
decision in Schmerber, states began enacting implied consent
statutes for drivers in order to compel drivers to submit to blood
alcohol concentration (hereinafter “BAC”) testing.25 In 2013,
listening device to the outside of a public phone booth to listen in on the private
telephone conversations of the defendant).
16. Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 33.
17. Id.
18. Smith v. Maryland., 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979).
19. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616 (1989).
20. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654 (1961) (concluding “[s]ince the
Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth, it is enforceable
against them by the same sanction of exclusion as is used against the Federal
Government”).
21. See generally Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952) (challenging the
extraction of evidence from within suspects’ body by law enforcement as a
violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourth Amendment); Breithaupt v.
Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 433 (1957) (same).
22. Rochin, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
23. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 433.
24. California v. Schmerber, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
25. See Michael A. Correll, Is There a Doctor in the (Station) House?:
Reassessing the Constitutionality of Compelled DWI Blood Draws Forty-Five
Years After Schmerber, 113 W. VA. L. REV., 381, 400-01 (2011) (recognizing that
the Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber on forcible blood draws has resulted
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however, the Supreme Court did away with the per se exception in
Missouri v. McNeely.26 Finally, in 2016, the Supreme Court
addressed whether the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine could
provide a categorical exception to the warrant requirement for blood
draws in Birchfield v. North Dakota.27 In line with the decision in
McNeely, the Court again refused to adopt a categorical per se
exception to the warrant requirement.28
1. Regulation of Blood Extractions Directed by Law
Enforcement Under the U.S. Constitution Prior to
Incorporation of the Fourth Amendment Against the
States
a. Rochin v. California (1952)
The seminal case in regards to involuntary invasions of bodily
integrity is Rochin v. California.29 There, three deputy sheriffs
entered the home of the defendant, Rochin, after receiving
information that he was selling narcotics. 30 Upon the officers’ entry,
Rochin swallowed two capsules of morphine located on a night stand
next to his bed.31 Rochin was handcuffed and taken to a local
hospital where law enforcement ordered medical personnel to pump
his stomach in order to recover the morphine.32 The issue was
whether the conduct on behalf of law enforcement under those
circumstances offended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.33 The Supreme Court concluded that the conduct of
the police “shock[ed] the conscience” and was so “brutal” and
“offensive” that it did not comport with traditional ideas of fair play
and decency.34 The Court concluded that the conduct of illegally
breaking into the privacy of Rochin’s home, struggling to open his
mouth and remove what was there, and forcibly extracting his
stomach's contents in order obtain evidence, was “bound to offend
even hardened sensibilities.”35
in states adopting statutory responses to limit their use by law enforcement).
26. Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (2013).
27. Birchfield v. North Dakota, 136 S. Ct. 2160, 2179 (2016).
28. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (“We conclude that a breath test, but not a
blood test, may be administered as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk
driving.”).
29. See Rochin, 342 U.S. at 166 (concluding that such conduct on behalf of
law enforcement where officers forcefully obtained evidence from a suspect’s
body offended the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 172.
35. Id. The Court expressed that “this is conduct that shocks the conscience.
Illegally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open his
mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of his stomach's
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b. Breithaupt v. Abram (1957)
Five years later, a criminal defendant challenged a forcible
blood draw authorized by law enforcement.36 Like Rochin, the
Court's assessment in Breithaupt was limited to Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process concerns. 37 There, law enforcement
ordered a physician to withdraw a blood sample from Breithaupt
while he was unconscious in order to procure evidence of his
intoxication after he was involved in a fatal automobile collision
which ultimately led to his conviction. 38
The Court distinguished the facts of the case from Rochin by
stating there “[was] nothing ‘brutal’ or ‘offensive’ in the taking of a
sample of blood when done . . . under the protective eye of a
physician.”39 The Court noted that while the blood draw was
administered while Breithaupt was unconscious, “absence of
conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily render the
taking a violation of a constitutional right. 40 The Court further
recognized that the state interest in deterring “the increasing
slaughter” that results from individuals driving under the influence
can be furthered by this method of blood alcohol testing, and
therefore concluded that public interest outweighs the individual's
right to immunity from such invasion of the body.41 Hence,
Breithaupt stood for the proposition that, in the context of drunk
driving, the state’s interest in deterring intoxicated driving
outweighed an individual’s privacy interest. 42
contents–this course of proceeding by agents of government to obtain evidence
is bound to offend even hardened sensibilities. They are methods too close to the
rack and the screw to permit of constitutional differentiation.” Id. Justice Black
also reasoned that the Fifth Amendment’s protection against compelled selfincrimination applied to the states and that “a person is compelled to be a
witness against himself not only when he is compelled to testify, but also when
as here, incriminating evidence is forcibly taken from him by a contrivance of
modern science.” Id. at 174.
36. Breithaupt, 352 U.S. at 432.
37. See id. at 434 (stating “[p]etitioner contends that his conviction, based
on the result of the involuntary blood test, deprived him of his liberty without
that due process of law guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution”).
38. Id. at 433 (“This sample was delivered to the patrolman and subsequent
laboratory analysis showed this blood to contain about .17% alcohol.”).
39. Id. at 435.
40. Id. at 435-36 (“The driver here was unconscious when the blood was
taken, but the absence of conscious consent, without more, does not necessarily
render the taking a violation of a constitutional right; and certainly, the test as
administered here would not be considered offensive by even the most
delicate.”).
41. Id. at 439-40.
42. See id. at 439 (concluding that the administration of a safeguarded blood
test to drivers suspected to be under the influence has a deterrent effect on the
public issue of drunk driving which far outweighs the concern of the suspect’s
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2. Regulation of Blood Extractions Directed by Law
Enforcement Under the U.S. Constitution After the
Incorporation of the Fourth Amendment Against the
States
a. Schmerber v. California (1966)
In 1966, the Supreme Court again confronted the issue of
forcible blood draws authorized by law enforcement suspects in
Schmerber v. California.43 The Court did away with the “shocks the
conscious” standard articulated in Rochin and adopted the
“reasonableness” standard as seen within the language of the
Fourth Amendment.44 There, Schmerber was arrested for driving
while intoxicated and a blood sample was extracted against his will
by a physician at a hospital under the direction of an arresting
officer.45 The Court rejected Schmerber’s argument against the
admissibility of the blood draw evidence under Breithaupt and
Rochin.46
The Court recognized that blood draws authorized by law
enforcement constitute searches of persons, and depend
antecedently upon seizures of persons, within the meaning of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”47 Justice Brennan’s majority opinion
stated the “Fourth Amendment's proper function is to constrain, not
against all intrusions as such, but against intrusions which are not
justified in the circumstances, or which are made in an improper
individual right to immunity from such invasion).
43. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 758 (stating petitioner objected to the
admission of blood draw evidence on the ground that the blood had been
withdrawn despite his refusal to consent to the test and that he contended that
in that circumstance the withdrawal of the blood and the admission of the
analysis in evidence denied him his right not to be subjected to unreasonable
searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment).
44. Id. at 767 (holding that there was no violation of petitioner's right to be
free of unreasonable searches and seizures when a police officer ordered a blood
draw without a warrant or consent because the arresting officer could have
reasonably concluded that the delay in obtaining a warrant could result in the
destruction or disappearance of evidence and because the test was conducted in
a reasonable manner).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 760 (noting that the Court affirmed the conviction in Breithaupt
resulting from the use of a blood test in evidence, holding that under such
circumstances the withdrawal did not offend that “sense of justice” of which the
Court spoke in Rochin). The Court stated that “Breithaupt thus requires the
rejection of petitioner's due process argument, and nothing in the circumstances
of this case to the text of the note or in supervening events persuades us that
this aspect of Breithaupt should be overruled.” Id.
47. Id. at 767-68. (“In other words, the questions we must decide in this case
are whether the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the
blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood
respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness.”).
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manner.”48
First, the Court deliberated whether the arresting officer
needed a warrant to order the blood draw 49 and concluded that,
given the circumstances, there was probable cause for the officer to
arrest Schmerber and charge him with driving under the influence
because the officer smelled liquor on his breath and Schmerber
demonstrated physical signs of intoxication. 50 The Court allowed for
the blood draw without a warrant under the exigent circumstances
doctrine on the grounds that the officer “. . . might reasonably have
believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the
delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances,
threatened ‘the destruction of evidence.’”51 This is because alcohol
dissipation in blood varies considerably with individual’s
metabolism and with time.52 Hence, the Court in Schmerber
determined that the dissipation of alcohol in the blood created a
“exigent circumstance” per se, constituting an exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 53
Second, the Court in Schmerber addressed the reasonableness
of the blood draw.54 The Court considered the extent to which the
procedure may threaten the individual's safety or health and the
extent of intrusion upon the individual's dignitary interests in
personal privacy and bodily integrity.55 The Court concluded that
the blood test was reasonable in that “[s]uch tests are commonplace
in these days of periodic physical examinations and experience with
them teaches that the quantity of blood extracted is minimal, and
that for most people the procedure involves virtually no risk,
trauma, or pain.”56 Further, the Court noted that the test was
performed in a reasonable manner because it was performed by a
48. Id.
49. Id. at 768 (“In this case, as will often be true when charges of driving
under the influence of alcohol are pressed, these questions arise in the context
of an arrest made by an officer without a warrant.”).
50. Id. at 768-69 (“The police officer who arrived at the scene shortly after
the accident smelled liquor on petitioner's breath, and testified that petitioner's
eyes were "bloodshot, watery, sort of a glassy appearance.").
51. Id. at 770 (quoting Preston v. United States 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)).
52. See Arthur I. Cederbaum, Alcohol Metabolism, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. OF MED.
NAT’L
INSTS.
OF
HEALTH,
667–85
(2012),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3484320/
(studying
alcohol
metabolism) (“The same dose of alcohol per unit of body weight can produce very
different blood alcohol concentrations in different individuals because of the
large variations in proportions of fat and water in their bodies, and the low lipid:
water partition coefficient of ethanol”).
53. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 771 (stating that “where time had to be taken to
bring the accused to a hospital and to investigate the scene of the accident, there
was no time to seek out a magistrate and secure a warrant” and concluding
“that the attempt to secure evidence of blood-alcohol content in this case was an
appropriate incident to petitioner's arrest”).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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physician, in a hospital environment under accepted medical
practice.57 The Court then reiterated society’s interest in deterring
individuals from driving under the influence stating that blood tests
do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s
right to privacy and bodily integrity. 58
3. Blood Draws Under State Implied-Consent Laws
The Supreme Court’s decisions in Rochin and its progeny
(specifically, Schmerber), allow state and local jurisdictions to
implement a variety of statutory legislation under state police
powers nationwide relating to intoxicated driving. 59 The issue of
intoxicated driving arose almost as soon as motor vehicles came
about and law enforcement has struggled to deter the public from
engaging in such conduct since. 60 In 2017, the National Highway
Traffic Safety Administration recorded 10,874 fatalities involving
drivers with blood alcohol levels above 0.08 g/dL. 61 Annually, drunk
driving costs Americans more than $44 billion. 62 Thus, state and
federal governments “have a compelling interest in creating
‘deterrent[s] to drunken driving,’ a leading cause of traffic fatalities
and injuries.”63 In order to combat alcohol-impaired driving, state
and local governments have taken a range of measures to deter
drinking and driving, namely, by way of implied consent laws. 64 If
a law enforcement officer obtains consent to an unreasonable
search, the consent exception to the warrant requirement applies. 65

57. Id. at 772.
58. Id.; see also Breithaupt 352 U.S. at 439 (concluding that the
administration of a safeguarded blood test to drivers suspected to be under the
influence has a deterrent effect on the public issue of drunk driving which far
outweighs the concern of the suspect’s individual right to immunity from such
invasion); Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761 (1985).
59. See Michael A. Correll, supra note 25, at 400-01 (recognizing that the
Supreme Court's decision in Schmerber on forcible blood draws has resulted in
states adopting statutory responses to limit their use by law enforcement).
60. JACOBS, supra note 10.
61. Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., Pub. No. DOT HS 812 630, AlcoholImpaired
Driving,
(
Nov.
2018),
crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812630.
62. Alina Comoreanu, Strictest and Most Lenient States on DUI,
WALLETHUB (Aug. 10, 2017), wallethub.com/edu/dui-penalties-by-state/13549/.
63. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179.
64. See generally JACOBS, supra note 10 (providing a comprehensive review
and analysis of America's drunk driving problem and of America's anti-drunk
driving policies and jurisprudence).
65. See Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. 292, 298 (2014) (concluding that
in the absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific
exception to the warrant requirements, including the exception for searches
conducted pursuant to voluntarily given consent); see also Christopher M.
Peterson, Irrevocable Implied Consent: The "Roach Motel" In Consent Search
Jurisprudence, 51 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 773, 779 (2014) (“Consent searches may be
an unusual exception to the Fourth Amendment, but they certainly are popular:
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After pegging a specific blood alcohol level, states enacted “implied
consent” laws to induce motorists to submit to blood alcohol
testing.66
The laws vary from state to state.67 Essentially, the laws
provide that individuals who drive upon the public highways of the
given state, or are licensed to drive within a given state, are deemed
to have given consent to one or more tests of his or her breath, blood
or urine.68 As such, the statutes “imply” that individuals provide
“consent” to otherwise unreasonable searches by driving while
intoxicated. Whether these statutes actually provide constitutional
“consent” that satisfies Fourth Amendment jurisprudence is highly
contested among the states.69
Originally, the consequences for refusal to submit to blood
alcohol testing would result in the loss of driving privileges and the
refusal would serve as evidence in a drunk-driving prosecution.70
However, in recent years, some states have adopted criminal
penalties for refusal.71
over ninety percent of warrantless searches are conducted based on consent of
the suspect searched.”).
66. See Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 (stating “[a]fter pegging inebriation to
a specific level of blood alcohol, States passed implied consent laws to induce
motorists to submit to BAC testing”).
67. See generally Jacob M. Appel, Nonconsensual Blood Draws and Dual
Loyalty: When Bodily Integrity Conflicts with The Public Health, 17 J. HEALTH
CARE L. POL’Y 129 (2014) (analyzing state laws regarding blood draws for law
enforcement purposes).
68. See Debra T. Landis, Driving While Intoxicated: Duty of Law
Enforcement Officer to Offer Suspect Chemical Sobriety Test Under Implied
Consent Law, 95 A.L.R.3d 710, 1 (1979) (stating that
“[i]mplied consent laws generally declare that driving is a privilege
subject to state licensing, with one of the conditions for obtaining a
license being that the driver submit to a test for intoxication whenever
he is arrested or taken into custody for any offense involving operating a
motor vehicle while intoxicated or under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and the arresting officer has reasonable grounds to believe that
prior to his arrest the person was driving in an intoxicated condition or
under the influence of alcohol.”)
69. See State v. Fierro, 853 N.W.2d 235, 241 (S.D. 2014) (finding an impliedconsent law unconstitutional because it authorized “consent” to Fourth
Amendment searches where actual, “free and voluntary consent” was absent);
State v. Pettijohn, 899 N.W.2d 1, 26-27 (Iowa 2017) (“[T]he clear implication of
the McNeely decision is that statutorily implied consent to submit to a
warrantless blood test under threat of civil penalties for refusal to submit does
not constitute consent for purposes of the Fourth Amendment.”); State v.
Romano, 800 S.E.2d 644, 652 (N.C. 2017) (“Treating [the statute] as an
irrevocable rule of implied consent does not comport with the consent exception
to the warrant requirement because such treatment does not require an
analysis of the voluntariness of consent based on the totality of the
circumstances”).
70. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2162.
71. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 (stating that “[w]hile these laws originally
provided that refusal to submit could result in the loss of the privilege of driving

500

UIC John Marshall Law Review

[52:489

4. End of the Per Se Exception
a. Missouri v. McNeely (2013)
In Missouri v. McNeely, forty-seven years after Schmerber, the
Court again addressed the police authorization of blood draws
without a warrant.72 There, McNeely was observed driving
recklessly and was apprehended by a law enforcement officer. 73 He
refused to consent to a blood draw and in response, the officer forced
a blood draw relying on the exigent circumstances exception
delineated in Schmerber.74
The question presented to the Court was “whether the natural
metabolization of alcohol in the bloodstream presents a per se
exigency that justifies an exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement for nonconsensual blood testing in all drunkdriving cases.”75 Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion stated that it
does not, holding that exigency in this context “must be determined
case-by-case based on the totality of the circumstances.” 76
Justice Sotomayor further explained that “[e]xigency applies
when ‘the needs of law enforcement [are] so compelling that [a]
warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment.’”77 The Court recognized that “officers may . . . conduct
a warrantless search when they have probable cause to believe that
failure to act would result in ‘imminent destruction of evidence.’”78
However, the Court reasoned that asserting the per se rule
established in Schmerber "fails to account for advances in the 47
years since Schmerber was decided that allow for the more
expeditious processing of warrant applications, particularly in
contexts like drunk-driving investigations where the evidence

and the use of evidence of refusal in a drunk-driving prosecution, more recently
States and the Federal Government have concluded that these consequences
are insufficient” and “[s]anctions for refusing to take a BAC test were increased
because consequences like license suspension were no longer adequate to
persuade the most dangerous offenders to agree to a test that could lead to
severe criminal sanctions”).
72. See generally McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 (analyzing whether the dissipation
of alcohol in the blood establishes a per se exigency and exception to the Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement).
73. Id. at 145-46.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 144.
76. Benjamin W. Perry, Recent Development: Fourth Amendment-Warrantless, Nonconsensual Seizures of a DWI Suspect's Blood: What Happens
if You Say no to the Breathalyzer? - Missouri V. Mcneely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013),
37 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 231, 232 (2013).
77. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 176 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460
(2011) and Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978)).
78. Id. at 177 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
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offered to establish probable cause is simple.”79 The Court stated
that there are undoubtedly circumstances where exigent
circumstances will serve as an exception to the warrant
requirement, but those cases should be analyzed by the facts on a
case-by-case basis.80 Hence, the McNeely Court narrowed the
application of the exigent circumstances exception holding “that in
drunk-driving investigations, the natural dissipation of alcohol in
the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in every case
sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” 81
The Court stated “[i]n those drunk-driving investigations where
police officers can reasonably obtain a warrant before a blood
sample can be drawn without significantly undermining the efficacy
of the search, the Fourth Amendment mandates that they do so.” 82
b. Birchfield v. North Dakota (2016)
In Birchfield v. North Dakota, the Supreme Court again
declined to allow a categorical exception to the warrant requirement
in analyzing how the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine applies to
breath and blood tests.83 Specifically, the Court addressed whether
motorists arrested for driving while intoxicated could be criminally
penalized for refusing to submit to warrantless BAC testing. 84
There the state implied consent law penalized BAC refusal with
criminal penalty.85
The Court concluded that a breath test may be administered
as a search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving without a
warrant, but a blood test may not.86 The Court reiterated that the
79. Id. at 154.
80. Id. at 153 (stating that:
“[w]e do not doubt that some circumstances will make obtaining a
warrant impractical such that the dissipation of alcohol from the
bloodstream will support an exigency justifying a properly conducted
warrantless blood test. That, however, is a reason to decide each case on
its facts . . . not to accept the considerable overgeneralization that a per
se rule would reflect”)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
81. Id. at 165.
82. Id. at 158.
83. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2183-85; Sara Jane Schlafstein, Birchfield v.
North Dakota: Warrantless Breath Tests and the Fourth Amendment, 12 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR, 189, 200 (2017).
84. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2172.
85. Id. at 2170.
86. Id.; see also id. at 2185 (stating in regards to warrantless breathalyzers,
the Court lacks “even the pretense of attempting to situate breath searches
within the narrow and weighty law enforcement needs that have historically
justified the limited use of warrantless searches” and fearing “that if the Court
continues down this road, the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement will
become nothing more than a suggestion”). The Court also stated that it
“conclude[s] that a breath test, but not a blood test, may be administered as a
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touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness and
adopted the analysis of its recent decision in Riley v. California87
which assesses the degree to which a search intrudes upon an
individual’s privacy and, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.88 The Court
considered the impact of blood testing on individual privacy
interests, concluding that “blood tests are significantly more
intrusive, and their reasonableness must be judged in light of the
availability of the less invasive alternative of a breath test.” 89
Further, the Court noted that where a suspect is unconscious, and
thus incapable of compliance with a breathalyzer, “police may apply
for a warrant if need be.”90 The Court noted that implied consent
laws are favorable in that they function to induce motorists to
submit to BAC testing.91 However, the scope of this consent must be
limited.92 The Court held that motorists could only be “deemed to
have consented” to conditions that are reasonably connected to
driving and the penalties must be proportional to the violation. 93
Applying this reasonableness standard, the Court further concluded
that “motorists cannot be deemed to have consented to submit to a
blood test on pain of committing a criminal offense.”94
Hence, Birchfield and McNeely stand for the proposition that
there is no per se exception to the warrant requirement for blood
draws and as a general rule, law enforcement must obtain a
warrant to compel a blood draw unless an exception applies. 95 While

search incident to a lawful arrest for drunk driving. As in all cases involving
reasonable searches incident to arrest, a warrant is not needed in this
situation.” Id.; but see id. at 2187 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
87. Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (quoting Brigham City,
547 U.S. at 403.
88. Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2176-84.
89. Id. at 2184.
90. See id. at 2178. (stating that “it is true that a blood test . . . may be
administered to a person who is unconscious . . . [b]ut we have no reason to
believe that such situations are common in drunk-driving arrests, and when
they arise, the police may apply for a warrant if need be”)(alteration in original).
91. Id. at 2179.
92. Id. at 2186.
93. Id. at 2186 (stating “motorists could be deemed to have consented to only
those conditions that are ‘reasonable’ in that they have a ‘nexus’ to the privilege
of driving and entail penalties that are proportional to severity of the violation”).
94.
It is another matter, however, for a State not only to insist upon an
intrusive blood test, but also to impose criminal penalties on the refusal
to submit to such a test. There must be a limit to the consequences to
which motorists may be deemed to have consented by virtue of a decision
to drive on public roads.
Id.

95. Compare McNeely, 569 U.S. at 157 (stating that “while the natural
dissipation of alcohol in the blood may support a finding of exigency in a specific
case, as it did in Schmerber, it does not do so categorically”) with Birchfield, 136
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there may be exceptions to the warrant requirement, these
exceptions must be analyzed on a case-by-case basis.96 But, does this
mean that law enforcement can compel medical personnel to
administer blood draws on patients without a warrant?

B. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability
Act
In obtaining blood draws, law enforcement officials are
required to conduct police investigations within the boundaries of
the Fourth Amendment and Supreme Court jurisprudence.
However, medical entities are required to disclose medical
information in compliance with HIPAA.
Congress passed HIPAA in 1996. 97 The act was introduced in
response to a need for privacy standards within the health care
field.98 As technology developed and expanded into the health care
realm, patients required assurance that their personal information
would be protected during the course of treatment and also in the
future as that information is maintained or transmitted within and
outside of the health care system. 99 The act serves to protect the
disclosure of “individually identifiable health information”
(hereinafter “IIHI”), or information which "identifies the individual
or allows a reasonable basis to believe the information can be used
to identify the individual."100 Medical records of a patient’s blood
alcohol concentration are IIHI under HIPAA and as such, the
disclosure of such information should fall within HIPAA privacy
standards.101

S. Ct. at 2185 (concluding that the search-incident-to-arrest doctrine does not
justify the warrantless taking of a blood sample).
96. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141; see also Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. at 2179 (“These
searches may nevertheless be exempt from the warrant requirement if they fall
within, as relevant here, the exception for searches conducted incident to a
lawful arrest. This exception applies categorically, rather than on a case-by-case
basis”.).
97. Deborah F. Buckman, Validity, Construction, and Application of Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) and Regulations
Promulgated Thereunder, 194 A.L.R. Fed. 133 (2004).
98. 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 59919 (1999).
99. Id.
100. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2019);
Any information, including genetic information, whether oral or recorded
any form or medium, that (1) Is created or received by a health care
provider . . . [or a broad range of other entities]; and (2) Relates to the
past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual; the prevision of health care to an individual; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an
individual.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019).
101. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2019);
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Prior to the enactment of HIPAA, efforts to provide legal
protection against the inappropriate disclosure of individually
identifiable health information was undertaken primarily by the
states.102 States adopted a number of laws designed to protect
patients against the inappropriate use of health information. 103
However, the framework was seriously deficient because
protections varied and the narrow focus on physician obligations left
large portions of the health care system without effective or
consistent constraints on the disclosure of medical information. 104
Lawmakers concluded “[t]he establishment of a consistent
foundation of privacy standards would . . . encourage the increased
and proper use of electronic information while also protecting the
very real needs of patients to safeguard their privacy.” 105
HIPAA contains remedies for violations including civil
penalties for the knowing and wrongful disclosure of IIHI. The
Office of Civil Rights under the Department of Health and Human
Services handles HIPAA complaints and can impose civil penalties
for failure to comply.106 The maximum civil penalty for violations,
whether knowing or due to willful neglect, is $1.5 million.107
As for the victim of an improper disclosure, HIPAA does not
authorize a private right of action.108 Where a request for a blood

Health information means any information, whether oral or recorded in
any form or medium, that . . . is created or received by a health care
provider . . . and . . . relates to the past, present, or future physical or
mental health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care
to an individual; or the past, present, or future payment for the provision
of health care to an individual.
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2019)(alteration in original).
102. 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 59920.
103. Id.
104. See id. (stating that while many medical entities “have taken steps to
safeguard the privacy of individually-identifiable health information . . . they
must currently rely on a patchwork of [s]tate laws and regulations that are
incomplete and, at times, inconsistent.”)
105.
These protections would begin to address growing public concerns that
advances in electronic technology in the health care industry are
resulting, or may result, in a substantial erosion of the privacy
surrounding individually identifiable health information maintained by
health care providers, health plans and their administrative contractors.
This rule would implement the privacy requirements of the
Administrative Simplification subtitle of the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act of 1996.
Id.

106. Jessica Jardine Wilkes, The Creation of HIPAA Culture: Prioritizing
Privacy Paranoia over Patient Care, 2014 B.Y.U.L. REV. 1213, 1227 (2014); 45
C.F.R. §160.404 (2019).
107. Id. at 1228; 45 C.F.R. § 160.404 (2019).
108. See Stewart v. City of Fort Wayne, 2019 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61222, at
*17-18 (N.D. Ind. Apr. 8, 2019) (stating that:
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draw violates HIPAA, neither exclusion of the records from evidence
nor suppression of evidence obtained by law enforcement’s use of
the records is among the remedies listed in HIPAA.109 Rather,
patients who fall victim to unlawfully obtained blood evidence are
left to seek remedy in court under a motion to suppress the evidence
on Fourth Amendment grounds.110
This section surveys the provisions of HIPAA as it relates to
the disclosure of IIHI. First, Section 1 discusses the Privacy Rule
which establishes a federal floor of privacy protection for the
disclosure of protected patient information. 111 Next, Section 2
discusses how and when HIPAA preempts state law as it relates to
disclosures of IIHI. Finally, Section 3 outlines when disclosures of
IIHI are permitted under HIPAA provisions.
1. The Privacy Rule
In general, the federal privacy regulations (the “Privacy Rule”)
under HIPAA require covered entities to maintain the
confidentiality of IIHI.112 This is a strict baseline rule of
confidentiality, prohibiting any use or disclosure of individually
identifiable health information, unless the provisions of HIPAA

It is well-settled that HIPAA does not furnish a private right of action.
HIPAA provides civil and criminal penalties for improper disclosures of
medical information, but it does not create a private cause of action,
leaving enforcement to the Department of Health and Human Services
alone. Every court to have considered the issue has concluded that
HIPAA does not authorize a private right of action.)
(internal citations omitted).
109. Matter of Miguel M. (Barron), 950 N.E.2d 107, 112 (N.Y. 2011).
110. See Thomas S. Stukes, Anthony H. Brett, & Jenny McKellar, North
Carolina Law Requires Nurses to Comply with Police Demand for Blood Draw,
WOMBLE
BOND
DICKINSON
(US)
LLP,
(Sept.
6,
2017),
www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ee3e0ce5-6346-4ddb-8267-d641f7
c839e7 (“If the courts later determine that the withdrawal was unjustified or
illegal, the results of the blood draw may be excluded from evidence.”).
111. Id.
112. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 59927 (1999). (stating that these standards
will be set forth in new subchapter C to Title 45 of the Code of Federal
Regulations as parts 160 and 164. Citations are given to the Federal Register
and the proposed cite to the Code of Federal Regulations);
The Secretary presented to the Congress her Recommendations for
protecting the ‘Confidentiality of Individually-Identifiable Health
Information’ as required by section 264 (a) of HIPAA. In those
Recommendations, the Secretary called for new federal legislation to
create a national floor of standards that provide fundamental privacy
rights for patients, and that define responsibilities for those who use and
disclose identifiable health information.
Id. at 59923.
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allow such disclosure.113
Under HIPAA, “covered entities” include health insurers,
claims-processing clearinghouses, and healthcare providers.114 All
covered entities must formulate policies that comply with the
provisions outlined within HIPAA or face strict criminal or civil
penalties.115 Any disclosure of IIHI that does not comply with
HIPAA is a violation of the law, even if inadvertent or resulting in
no actual harm to the patient.116
It would appear that under a reasonable expectation of privacy
theory, patient health records are protected under the Fourth
Amendment as well. However, the Supreme Court has not directly
held that the Fourth Amendment extends its protections to health
information.117

113. Id.
114. See 64 Fed. Reg. 59918, 60049 (1999) (stating that “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided, the standards, requirements, and implementation
specifications adopted or designated under the parts of this subchapter apply to
any entity that is: (a) A health plan; (b) A health care clearinghouse; and (c) A
health care provider who transmits any health information in electronic form
in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter”); see also LISA
BOYLE & PAUL KNAG, HIPAA: A GUIDE TO HEALTHCARE PRIVACY AND SECURITY
LAW (2002) (explaining that covered entities include, but are not limited to,
hospitals, nursing homes, HMOs, mental health and addictions facilities,
pharmaceutical companies, employers, accrediting organizations, research
universities, public health agencies, third-party administrators, auditors,
banks, and attorneys).
115. See generally, 45 C.F.R. § 164.522(a)(1) (2019) (stating provisions on
compliance and enforcement.); see also Jonathan P. Tomes & Alice M. McCart,
Law Enforcement and HIPAA: Everything a Law Enforcement Officer Needs to
Know: HIPAA & HITECH Act Blog, VETERANS PRESS (Sept. 25, 2016),
www.veteranspress.com/law-enforcement-hipaa (commenting that covered
entities under HIPAA fear HIPAA’s criminal penalties, which include up to ten
years’ imprisonment and a $250,000 fine and civil money penalties, the largest
of which to date has been $4.8 million.).
116. MARK A. HALL, MARY ANNE BOBINSKI & DAVID ORENTLICHER,
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 174 (Vicki Been et al. eds.,
3d ed. 2013) (“Enforcement of the privacy Rule initially appeared lax to some
critics, until passage of the HITECH Act in 2009 required the imposition of
penalties for all violations.”); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.402(a) (2019) (identifying
that under the regulations of the HITECH act of 2009, the Department of
Health and Human Services “will impose a civil money penalty upon a covered
entity” for violations).
117. Mark A. Rothstein, Column: Currents in Contemporary Bioethics:
Constitutional Right to Informational Health Privacy in Critical Condition, 39
J.L. MED. & ETHICS 280, 283 (2011); Nasa v. Nelson, 562 U.S. 134, 138 (2011)
(“assum[ing], without deciding, that the Constitution protects a privacy right"
in medical information); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1977) (stating
that the state's ability to collect medical information typically is accompanied
by a statutory or regulatory duty to avoid unwarranted disclosures which
"arguably has its roots in the Constitution," but finding it need not determine
that issue on the facts before it).
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2. Preemption Under the Privacy Rule
HIPAA provides as a general rule that “[a] standard,
requirement, or implementation specification adopted under this
subchapter that is contrary to a provision of State law preempts the
provision of State law.”118 However, the rule is subject to certain
exceptions.119 The most controversial exception states that where
HIPAA provisions are “contrary” to state law, HIPAA provisions
control and will preempt state law unless the provision of state law
“relates to the privacy of individually identifiable health
information and is more stringent than a standard, requirement, or

118. 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2019)
119.
This general rule applies, except if one or more of the following conditions
is met:
(a) A determination is made by the Secretary under § 160.204 that the
provision of State law:
(1) Is necessary:
(i) To prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision of or payment
for health care;
(ii) To ensure appropriate State regulation of insurance and health
plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute or regulation;
(iii) For State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or
(iv) For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health,
safety, or welfare, and, if a standard, requirement, or implementation
specification under part 164 of this subchapter is at issue, if the
Secretary determines that the intrusion into privacy is warranted
when balanced against the need to be served; or
(2) Has as its principal purpose the regulation of the manufacture,
registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled
substances (as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802), or that is deemed a controlled
substance by State law.
(b) The provision of State law relates to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information and is more stringent than a standard,
requirement, or implementation specification adopted under subpart E
of part 164 of this subchapter.
(c) The provision of State law, including State procedures established
under such law, as applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or
injury, child abuse, birth, or death, or for the conduct of public health
surveillance, investigation, or intervention.
(d) The provision of State law requires a health plan to report, or to
provide access to, information for the purpose of management audits,
financial audits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or
certification of facilities or individuals.
45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2019).
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implementation specification adopted” under the act. 120 This
preemption provision establishes an analytical framework for
medical entities to determine whether HIPAA preempts state law.
In efforts to clarify this rule, HIPAA further provides certain
definitions. The term “state law” is broadly defined as encompassing
any “constitution, statute, regulation, rule, common law, or other
State action having the force and effect of law.” 121 A state law is
“contrary” when a covered entity “would find it impossible to comply
with both the State and federal requirements” or “the provision of
State law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives” of the act. 122 A state
law is "more stringent" if it meets at least one of six enumerated
criteria: (1) it prohibits use or disclosure of IIHI under
circumstances where HIPAA would permit it; (2) it provides
patients of IIHI with "greater rights of access or amendment" to
their information; (3) it provides a "greater amount of information"
to patients about use, disclosure, rights, or remedies; (4) it provides
requirements that narrow the scope or duration, increase the
privacy protections afforded, or reduce the coercive effect of the
circumstances surrounding the need for express legal permission
with respect to the form, substance, or need for legal permission
prior to a use or disclosure; (5) it provides for more detailed
recordkeeping or accounting of disclosures; or (6) "with respect to
any other matter, [it] provides greater privacy protection" for the
subject of the information.123
In order to decide issues of preemption, HIPAA demands that
individual provisions of HIPAA and state laws be compared.124
Essentially, this is a three-part analysis. First, the state law must
“relate to” the privacy of IIHI. Second, the state law must be
analyzed to determine whether it is “contrary” to HIPAA. Finally, if
the state law is “contrary” to HIPAA provisions, then it must be
analyzed to determine whether it is “more stringent.” If the state
law is “more stringent,” then the state laws are complementary, and

120. Grace Ko, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 497, 504 (2006); 45 C.F.R. § 160.203.
121. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
122. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202(1)-(2) (2019).
123. Ko, supra note 120, at 504-505; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
124.
A covered entity would begin by identifying all state law provisions that
affect its privacy policies and practices, decide which of those provisions
specifically "relate to" the privacy of individually identifiable health
information, and then determine whether they are "contrary" to the
corresponding federal standard and, if so, whether they are "more
stringent.").
Ko, supra note 120 at 505.
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both the state law and HIPAA provisions apply. If not, then HIPAA
preempts the state law and is controlling. This is a partial
preemption provision because HIPAA preempts only state laws that
provide weaker privacy protections; therefore, states remain free to
adopt and enforce more protective regimes.125
3. Permitted Disclosures Under the Privacy Rule
Generally, HIPAA prohibits the use and disclosure of IIHI
without patient authorization.126 However, the rule is subject to
certain exceptions.127 The Privacy Rule carves out twelve “permitted
disclosure” standards for the use and disclosure of protected IIHI by
covered entities.128 Under these standards, a covered entity may use
or disclose protected health information without the written
authorization or consent of the patient. 129 Four of these standards
125.
[W]e intend this provision [(sec 164.512(a)] to preserve access to
information considered important enough by state or federal authorities
to require its disclosure by law. The importance of these required uses or
disclosures is evidenced by the legislative or other public process
necessary for the government to create a legally binding obligation on a
covered entity. . . . It is not possible, or appropriate, for HHS to reassess
the legitimacy of or the need for each of these mandates in each of their
specialized contexts. . . . [J]urisdictions have determined that public
policy purposes cannot be achieved absent the use of certain protected
health information, and we have chosen in general not to disturb their
judgments.
Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information,
65 FR 82462-01, 2000 WL 1875566 (Dec. 28, 2000); 45 C.F.R. § 160.201.205 (2019).
126.
Generally, HIPPA prohibits the use and disclosure of an individual's
protected health information unless the individual has authorized its use
and disclosure. HIPPA provides, however, that a covered entity may use
or disclose protected health information without the written
authorization of the individual or the opportunity for the individual to
agree or object in certain limited circumstances.
United States v. Elliot, 676 F. Supp. 2d 431, 437 (D. Md. 2009).
127. Id.
128. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019) (stating that the standards include uses
and disclosures of IIHI: (1) required by law; (2) for public health activities; (3)
about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence; (4) for health oversight
activities; (5) for judicial and administrative proceedings; (6) for law
enforcement purposes; (7) about decedents; (8) for cadaveric organ, eye or tissue
donation purposes; (9) for research purposes; (10) to avert a serious threat to
health or safety; (11) for specialized government functions; and (12) for workers’
compensation).
129. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019) (stating that a covered entity may “use
or disclose protected health information without the written authorization of
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provide exceptions to the Privacy Rule where disclosures are
“required by law.”130 The first standard, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a):
“Uses and disclosures required by law,” has two subparts:131
(1) A covered entity may use or disclose protected health information
to the extent that such use or disclosure is required by law and the
use or disclosure complies with and is limited to the relevant
requirements of such law.
(2) A covered entity must meet the requirements described in
paragraph (c), (e), or (f) of this section for uses or disclosures required
by law.132

Subsection (1), standing alone, suggests that protected IIHI
can be disclosed to the extent that the use or disclosure is required
by law.133 Because “law” is not further defined within the text of the
“permitted disclosure” provision, the reasonable implication is that
the term “law” is defined by the definition provided in the
preemption provision, which defines “state law” as encompassing
any constitution, statute, regulation, rule, common law, or other
state action having the force and effect of law, as previously defined
under the act.134 At first glance, the phrase “as required by law”
implies that any law can mandate the disclosure of IIHI.
However, a careful reading of subsection (2) limits the scope of
this provision by expressly providing which “law” the provision
refers to. Subsection (2) identifies three situations (“paragraphs (c),
(e), or (f)”135) in which particular requirements must be met in order
to disclose protected information as “required by law.” 136 These
the individual, as described in § 164.508 (2019), or the opportunity for the
individual to agree or object as described in § 164.510 (2019), in the situations
covered by this section, subject to the applicable requirements of this section”).
130. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019) (stating that “[a] covered entity may
use or disclose protected health information to the extent that such use or
disclosure is required by law and the use or disclosure complies with and is
limited to the relevant requirements of such law”).; see also 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(c) (2019) (describing the standard for disclosures about victims of
abuse, neglect or domestic violence.); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2019)
(describing the standard for disclosures for judicial and administrative
proceedings); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2019) (describing the standard for
disclosures for law enforcement purposes).
131. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019).
132. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(2) (2019); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2019)
(addressing disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic violence); 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(e) (2019) (discussing disclosures for judicial and
administrative proceedings); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2019) (discussing
disclosures for law enforcement purposes).
133. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(1) (2019).
134. See Ko, supra note 120, at 503 (recognizing that under HIPAA “’state
law’ is broadly defined to encompass any ‘constitution, statute, regulation, rule,
common law, or other State action having the force and effect of law’”).
135. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(2) (2019).
136. Id.; see generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (stating that 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c)
is the standard for disclosures about victims of abuse, neglect or domestic
violence, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(e) is the standard for disclosures for judicial and

2019]

Everyone Bleeds Guilty

511

subsections establish requirements for the disclosure of IIHI about
victims of abuse, disclosures for judicial and administrative
proceedings, and disclosures for law enforcement purposes.137
For the purposes of this comment, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (f), the
standard for disclosures “for law enforcement purposes,” is most
applicable to blood draws conducted by medical personnel at the
direction of law enforcement.138 Pursuant to this provision, a
covered entity may disclose IIHI for a law enforcement purpose to a
law enforcement official under six scenarios. 139 Disclosures are
permitted: (1) if pursuant to process and as otherwise required by
law;140 (2) for the limited purpose of identification and location; 141
(3) for an individual who is or suspected to be the victim of a
crime;142 (4) for decedents for the purpose of alerting law
enforcement of the death of the individual; 143 (5) for crimes on the
premises of the covered entity;144 and (6) for the purpose of reporting
crime in emergencies.145
When police officers order medical personnel to extract
patient’s blood for the purposes of creating a medical record of blood
alcohol content to be used as evidence, only the first standard
(pursuant to process and as otherwise required by law) 146 and third
standard (an individual who is or suspected to be the victim of a
crime)147 are applicable.
a. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1): Disclosures are permitted if
pursuant to process and as otherwise required by law.
This provision outlines when disclosures are permitted if
pursuant to process and as otherwise “required by law.”148 There are
two ways disclosures are permitted under this provision. The first
section149 states that a covered entity may disclose protected health
information “as required by law including laws that require the
administrative proceedings, and 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) is the standard for
disclosures for law enforcement purposes).
137. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(2) (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(c) (2019); 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.512(e) (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2019).
138. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2019).
139. Id.
140. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2019).
141. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(2)(i) (2019).
142. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3) (2019).
143. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(4) (2019).
144. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(5) (2019) (stating a covered entity may
disclose protected health information only if the entity believes in good faith
that such information constitutes evidence of criminal conduct that occurred on
the premises of the covered entity).
145. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(6) (2019).
146. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2019).
147. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3) (2019).
148. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2019).
149. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019).
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reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries.” 150
However, as noted in the previous provision, the term “as required
by law” is not defined within the text. Because the preemption
provision defines “state law” as any “constitution, statute,
regulation, rule, common law, or other State action having the force
and effect of law,”151 a broad interpretation would infer that the text
refers to any state law as this disclosure provision is unclear what
“law” the text refers to. The provision clearly distinguishes laws
that require reporting of certain types of wounds, such as gun-shot
wounds. However, where the patient is suspected of driving while
intoxicated or is the victim of an accident resulting from intoxicated
driving, laws that require reporting of “certain types of wounds”
may not apply. Thus, because “as required by law” is not defined
further, it is unclear whether any state law can require the
disclosure of IIHI where HIPAA would otherwise prohibit it.
The second section152 indicates that a covered entity may
disclose protected health information in compliance with a court
order or warrant, or a subpoena or summons issued by a judicial
officer; as grand jury subpoena; or153 an administrative request,
including an administrative subpoena or summons, a civil
investigative demand, or similar process authorized under law.154
Hence, this provision provides that a warrant or form of
judicial order is required for police to direct medical personnel to
extract patients’ blood. 155 However, it does not address whether the
legislature can mandate disclosure where HIPAA would otherwise
prohibit it.
b. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3): Disclosures are permitted for
an individual who is or suspected to be the victim of a
crime.
Under this provision, if the individual is or suspected to be the
victim of a crime, he must agree or otherwise consent to the
disclosure of IIHI.156 Therefore, law enforcement cannot authorize
disclosure of the results of a blood extraction if individual does not
consent to the disclosure.157 The provision further states, however,
that if the individual cannot agree due to incapacity or other
emergency circumstances, then the information can be disclosed
only if the three following conditions are met: 158

150. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019) (emphasis added).
151. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
152. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2019).
153. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii)(B) (2019).
154. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2019).
155. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2019).
156. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(i) (2019).
157. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(i) (2019).
158. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii) (2019).
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(A) The law enforcement official represents that such information is
needed to determine whether a violation of law by a person other than
the victim has occurred, and such information is not intended to be
used against the victim;159
(B) The law enforcement official represents that immediate law
enforcement activity that depends upon the disclosure would be
materially and adversely affected by waiting until the individual is
able to agree to the disclosure; and160
(C) The disclosure is in the best interests of the individual as
determined by the covered entity, in the exercise of professional
judgment.161

Hence, individuals who can consent, must do so.162 However, if
the individual cannot consent, there are three conditions that must
be met prior to disclosure.163
Thus, the provisions of HIPAA, when carefully read together,
outline the very narrow circumstances where law enforcement can
compel medical personnel to disclose IIHI without the patient’s
consent for law enforcement purposes. Ignoring the ambiguity
created by the phrase, “as required by law,” HIPAA provides that a
covered entity may disclose IIHI if state laws require the reporting
of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries 164 or it may
disclose IIHI in compliance with a warrant or other judicial order.165
Where the patient is someone who is or suspected to be the
159. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(A) (2019).
160. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(B) (2019).
161. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(C) (2019).
162. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(i) (2019).
163. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3) (2019).
164. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019).
165. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(ii) (2019).
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victim of a crime, law enforcement and medical personnel must
obtain his consent.166 If the patient is incapable of consenting, law
enforcement must establish three requirements: (1) that the
information is needed to determine whether someone other than the
victim has violated the law and that the information is not intended
to be used against the victim; 167 (2) that waiting for the individual
to consent would materially and adversely affect law enforcement
activity;168 and (3) that disclosure is in the best interests of the
individual as determined by the covered entity.169

III. ANALYSIS
As currently drafted and applied, HIPAA fails to accomplish
the goals Congress sought in its enactment. This is because, as
applied to blood draw requests for law enforcement purposes, the
provisions of the act are difficult to apply and even more difficult to
enforce. This section analyzes where HIPAA falls short in its
application. Section A will address issues with the HIPAA
preemption analysis. Section B will discuss recent developments in
implied-consent law and how they frustrate the preemption
analysis. Section C will discuss state laws that are contrary to
HIPAA in that they compel medical personnel to conduct blood
draws upon requests made by law enforcement without
consideration of preemption. Section D will discuss how the
difference between “state law” and “state action” in the blood draw
context affects the preemption analysis. Finally, Section E will tie
these issues together by providing an analysis of what happened in
the Utah case with nurse Wubbles.

A. The Problem With the Preemption Analysis
The language used in HIPAA’s “permitted disclosure” and the
preemption provision undercuts the authority and purpose of the
act because it proposes an analytical framework that is not clear
and not easily applied.
The burden is on the covered entity to apply this analytical
framework and formulate corresponding policies.170 A covered
entity must (1) identify all state law provisions that “relate to” IIHI
and its privacy policies; (2) evaluate whether they are “contrary” to
HIPAA; and (3) determine whether the state law provisions are
“more stringent” than the provisions of HIPAA. 171 Much of the
language of HIPAA’s preemption provision is ambiguous, indefinite
166. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(i) (2019).
167. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(A) (2019).
168. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(B) (2019).
169. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(C).
170. Ko, supra note 120, at 502.
171. Id. at 505.
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and unworkable. Compliance with the preemption provisions is
further complicated by definitional uncertainties in the act that
make it very difficult for both covered entities and courts to
determine when state law is in fact preempted.” 172 The preemption
analysis requires a series of potentially subjective determinations
of whether the state law “relates to” the disclosure of IIHI, whether
it is “contrary” and whether it is “more stringent.”
Further, the mere determination of whether a state law
“relates to” IIHI privacy is daunting alone as relevant provisions
can be found in a variety of laws such as insurance, worker’s
compensation, public health, birth and death records, adoptions,
criminal law, education, and welfare.173 This comment will narrow
its focus on criminal law, implied consent laws and statutes relating
to implied consent laws.

B. Recent Developments in Implied-Consent Law
Implied consent laws imply that motorists have consented to
some form of blood-alcohol testing upon suspicion of drunk
driving.174 As such, law enforcement, acting under the authority of
these implied consent laws, may compel medical personnel to
conduct blood draws on patients under circumstances where HIPAA
would otherwise not permit, namely, those requested in the absence
of a warrant or court order. While medical entities can put forth best
efforts in maintaining policies based on a preemption analysis, the
law is not static and as states pass new implied consent statutes,
among the abundance of other state laws “related to” IIHI, covered
entities are unable to confidently rely on previous preemption
assessments.175 Implied consent laws are a prime example.
The scope of implied consent laws has recently been subject to
Supreme Court scrutiny as demonstrated by Birchfield and is still
being evaluated. Further, many courts have struggled with the
application of McNeely and Birchfield to implied consent statutes
when applying their holdings to unconscious suspects and have

172. Id.
173.
Preemption analysis may require covered entities to cultivate a greater
depth and breadth of knowledge about state law than they needed prior
to HIPAA. The task of identifying every applicable state law provision is
extremely burdensome on its own. And HIPAA adds yet another layer of
analysis, not only by imposing its own set of regulations, but also by
forcing covered entities to examine the interactions between the
preexisting state laws and the new federal standards.
Id. at 506-08.
174. Landis, supra note 68, at 1.
175. Ko, supra note 120, at 510.
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reached differing conclusions. 176 Some courts have found
warrantless blood draws from an unconscious suspect to be
constitutional, reasoning that statutory implied consent satisfies
the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement.177 Others have held that implied consent of an
unconscious suspect is insufficient to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.178
While HIPAA outlines the conditions that must be met for the
disclosure of IIHI in the event that the patient is unconscious, 179 it
has not prevented states from enacting and enforcing contrary laws.
For example, twenty-nine states have laws sanctioning warrantless
blood draws from intoxicated driving suspects who are
unconscious.180
Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in the
case of Mitchell v. Wisconsin.181 There, a suspect was arrested for
operating a vehicle while intoxicated.182 The suspect fell
unconscious while police transported him to a hospital and was
therefore unable to consent to a blood draw. 183 The arresting officer
requested a blood draw despite his inability to consent pursuant to
176. Compare People v. Hyde, 2017 CO 24, ¶ 32 (holding that blood draw
from an unconscious suspect was constitutional because statutory implied
consent satisfies the consent exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement), with State v. Havatone, 241 Ariz. 506 (2017) (holding that the
"unconscious clause" of the implied-consent statute was unconstitutional as
applied to the defendant and further determining that the "unconscious clause"
can be constitutionally applied only when exigent circumstances prevent law
enforcement from obtaining a warrant); see also Bailey v. State, 338 Ga. App.
428, 434 (2016) ("[I]mplied consent of an unconscious suspect is insufficient to
satisfy the Fourth Amendment.").
177. Hyde, 2017 CO 24 at ¶ 32.
178. Bailey, 338 Ga. App. at 434.
179. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(ii)(C) (2019).
180. Ala. Code § 32-5-192(b) (2019); Alaska Stat. § 28.35.035(b) (2018); Ariz.
Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28-1321(C) (2019); Ark. Code Ann. § 5-65-202(b) (2019); Cal.
Veh. Code § 23612(a)(5) (2019); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 42-4-1301.1(8) (2018); Fla.
Stat. § 316.1932(1)(c) (2018); Ga. Code Ann. § 40-5-55(b) (2018); 625 ILCS 5/11501.1(b) (2019); Iowa Code § 321J.7 (2018); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 189A.103(2)
(2019); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 32:661(B) (2018); Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc.
§ 10-305 (c) (2019); Mo. Rev. Stat. § 577.033 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through
100th General Assembly, HB 14, HB 77, & HB 448); Mont. Code Ann. 61-8402(3) (2019); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 484C.160 (2019); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 265A:13 (2019); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 66-8-108 (2019); N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(b)
(2019); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 4511.191(4) (Page, Lexis Advance through file 3
(SB 23)); Okla. Stat. Tit. 47, §751 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through the 57th
Legislature act chapter 78, with the exception of chapters 11, 25, 38, 45, 55, &
68); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 813.140 (2019); S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5- 2950(H); Tex.
Transp. Code Ann. § 724.014 (2017); Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-522 (2018); 23 Vt.
Stat. Ann. § 1202(a)(2) (2018); W. Va. Code, § 17C-5-7(a) (2019); Wis. Stat. §
343.305(3)(b) (2018); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 31-6-102(c) (2019).
181. Mitchell v. Wisconsin, OYEZ, www.oyez.org/cases/2018/18-6210 (last
visited Apr 27, 2019).
182. State v. Mitchell, 2018 WI 84, ¶¶6-7 (2018).
183. Mitchell, 2018 WI at ¶¶8-10.
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a Wisconsin implied consent statute authorizing the blood draw of
an unconscious motorist suspected of driving while intoxicated.184
In its decision, the Court will determine whether a statute that
authorizes a blood draw from an unconscious motorist provides an
exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. 185
Pending the outcome of the case, the aforementioned twenty-nine
states with similar implied-consent provisions may be forced to
strike these provisions.
Further, states have recently taken on the challenge of
evaluating the constitutionality of these statutes individually. In
North Carolina v. Romano, the Supreme Court of North Carolina
declared a provision of North Carolina’s implied consent statute
unconstitutional.186 The statute authorized law enforcement to
obtain blood samples from unconscious patients suspected of
driving while intoxicated without a search warrant.187 The court
held that the statute was unconstitutionally applied to the
patient/defendant where there was no warrant or consent and no
exigent circumstances were present.188 As such, the court struck
down the law as unconstitutional.189 Thus, it suffices to say that the
state of implied consent laws is in flux.
Court decisions that directly analyze laws relating to the
disclosure of patient IIHI undoubtedly assist medical entities in
conducting their preemption analysis because they provide
guidance where HIPAA is not clear. However, the language of
HIPAA still leaves entities struggling to find a balance under
circumstances where there is no judicial advocacy and where it is
unclear whether HIPAA preempts a law authorizing an otherwise
prohibited disclosure under the act. Medical entities should not be
burdened with keeping up with the rapidly changing state laws. Nor
should they be limited by statutory provisions regarding disclosure
of IIHI where HIPAA provides guidance.

184. Id. at ¶12; see also Wis. Stat. Ann. § 343.305(3)(b) (stating “[a] person
who is unconscious or otherwise not capable of withdrawing consent is
presumed not to have withdrawn consent”).
185. OYEZ, supra note 181.
186. Romano, 800 S.E.2d at 646.
187. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-16.2(b) (2019) (“If a law enforcement officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person has committed an implied-consent
offense, and the person is unconscious or otherwise in a condition that makes
the person incapable of refusal, the law enforcement officer may direct the
taking of a blood sample or may direct the administration of any other chemical
analysis that may be effectively performed.”).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 691 (stating that “[t]reating N.C.G.S. § 655.2(b) as an
irrevocable rule of implied consent does not comport with the consent exception
to the warrant requirement because such treatment does not require an
analysis of the voluntariness of consent based on the totality of the
circumstances”).
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C. Statutes Directly Compelling Medical Personnel to
Draw Blood
Even where courts evaluate the constitutionality of implied
consent laws, medical entities are still subject to confusion as to
whether law enforcement can compel them to draw blood.
The decision in North Carolina v. Romano is instructive. While
the North Carolina Supreme Court struck down the
unconstitutional provision of its implied consent statute, this was
not the statute that required medical personnel to comply with law
enforcement’s requests. Rather, North Carolina’s general statute
20-139.1 on procedures governing chemical analyses requires
medical personnel to comply with law enforcement requests. 190 This
statute provides that “when a blood test is specified as the type of
chemical analysis by a law enforcement officer, a physician,
registered nurse, emergency medical technician, or other qualified
person shall withdraw the blood sample, and no further
authorization or approval is required.”191 The statute further
provides:
[a] person requested to withdraw blood . . . pursuant to this
subsection may refuse to do so only if it reasonably appears that the
procedure cannot be performed without endangering the safety of the
person collecting the sample or the safety of the person from whom
the sample is being collected.192

Hence, in North Carolina, medical personnel cannot refuse to
conduct blood draws directed by law enforcement officers unless the
draw will endanger the safety of either medical personnel or the
patient.193 The rule applies even when the patient is conscious and
actively refusing to submit to a blood draw.194 This statute focuses
not on the suspect, but on medical personnel required to draw blood
under the direction of law enforcement.195
Further, the statute does not provide enough information to
employ HIPAA’s preemption analysis. The statute is clearly
“contrary” to HIPAA because it states that medical personnel are
required to withdraw the blood sample with no further
authorization or approval.196 However, while the statute implies
that it “relates to” IHII privacy, it does not discuss that actual
disclosure to law enforcement. As such, it is unclear whether the
190. See N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(c) (providing that medical personnel
cannot refuse blood draws directed by law enforcement officers unless it is
determined that the withdrawal will endanger the safety of either the medical
personnel or the patient).
191. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(c) (2019).
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(d)(2) (2019).
195. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 20-139.1(c) (2019).
196. Id.

2019]

Everyone Bleeds Guilty

519

preemption analysis applies. Therefore, despite the disposition of
the court on the constitutionality of the implied consent law
provision, medical entities are still bound to oblige with an officer’s
mere request under this statute.
Similarly, in Arizona, law enforcement officials are required to
obtain a warrant to authorize blood draws on suspects of driving
under the influence; however, the statute further states:
. . . if a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a
person has violated § 28-1381197 and a sample of blood, urine or other
bodily substance is taken from that person for any reason, a portion
of that sample sufficient for analysis shall be provided to a law
enforcement officer if requested for law enforcement purposes.198

Therefore, in Arizona, medical personnel are required to draw
blood under the direction of a law enforcement official. 199

D. State Action
The preemption analysis outlined in HIPAA also falls short
when considering state action. Where a law enforcement officer
requests a blood draw without patient consent or a warrant, at least
three parties are involved: the patient, medical personnel, and the
law enforcement officer.
The preemption provision states that HIPAA preempts state
law that is “contrary” to HIPAA,200 yet it also defines “state law” as
197. A.R.S. § 28-1381 (2019).
198. A.R.S. § 28-1388 (2019).
199. Id.
200. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2019) (stating that:
This general rule applies, except if one or more of the following conditions
is met:
(a) A determination is made by the Secretary under § 160.204 that the
provision of State law:
(1) Is necessary:
(i) To prevent fraud and abuse related to the provision of or payment
for health care;
(ii) To ensure appropriate State regulation of insurance and health
plans to the extent expressly authorized by statute or regulation;
(iii) For State reporting on health care delivery or costs; or
(iv) For purposes of serving a compelling need related to public health,
safety, or welfare, and, if a standard, requirement, or implementation
specification under part 164 of this subchapter is at issue, if the
Secretary determines that the intrusion into privacy is warranted
when balanced against the need to be served; or
(2) Has as its principal purpose the regulation of the manufacture,
registration, distribution, dispensing, or other control of any controlled
substances (as defined in 21 U.S.C. 802), or that is deemed a controlled
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encompassing statutes and “[s]tate action having the force and
effect of law.”201 Thus, upon a request for a blood draw, the medical
entity would first have to establish whether a police officer is acting
under the authority of a statute or his authority as a law
enforcement officer engaging in state action.
If the authority is state law, the medical entity would have to
refer to its policy and determine whether the most recent implied
consent law provisions have been analyzed. If not, the medical
entity and its personnel are forced to conduct a preemption analysis
on the spot to determine: (1) whether the statute is “related to” the
privacy of IIHI; (2) whether the statute is “contrary” to HIPAA; and
(3) whether the statutory provisions are “more stringent” than the
provisions of HIPAA.202
However, if the law enforcement officer is engaging in state
action, the lines are blurred and the preemption analysis is
essentially unusable because the evaluation turns on the conduct of
the law enforcement officer, and not statutory provision. Because
medical personnel are subject to the laws of the state, they have a
legal duty to serve the public and adhere to state law or state
action.203 Common practice results in medical entities having dual
loyalties.204 While they have an ethical duty to individual patients,
providers also have an ethical duty to serve the public and adhere
to state law.205 Because the “permitted disclosure” provisions are
unclear as to what “as required by law” means, medical personnel
may reasonably believe they have no other choice but to comply with
substance by State law.
(b) The provision of State law relates to the privacy of individually
identifiable health information and is more stringent than a standard,
requirement, or implementation specification adopted under subpart E
of part 164 of this subchapter.
(c) The provision of State law, including State procedures established
under such law, as applicable, provides for the reporting of disease or
injury, child abuse, birth, or death, or for the conduct of public health
surveillance, investigation, or intervention.
(d) The provision of State law requires a health plan to report, or to
provide access to, information for the purpose of management audits,
financial audits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or
certification of facilities or individuals).
201. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
202. Ko, supra note 120, at 505.
203. Appel, supra note 67, at 150 (stating:
[p]hysicians who forcibly provide such care over a patient's objections
will risk civil liability and may be guilty of battery. At the same time,
government and professional authorities have long accepted that
medical providers, as licensees of the state and possessors of a statesanctioned monopoly in the healing arts, have dual loyalties).
204. Id.
205. Id.
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the request.206 The officer’s request for blood records “relates to” the
privacy of IIHI. The request may also be “contrary” to HIPAA if the
surrounding circumstances do not fall into the “permitted
disclosure” provisions of HIPAA. However, determining whether
the officer’s conduct is “more stringent” 207 than the provisions of
HIPAA calls for a speculative and subjective analysis based on the
facts and circumstances surrounding the scenario which cannot
reasonably be made by medical personnel or law enforcement. 208

E. What Happened in Utah?
The Utah case involving Alex Wubbles ties all of these issues
together. There, the patient was unconscious as a result of an auto
accident and the University of Utah Hospital’s policy stated that
law enforcement could obtain blood samples for patients suspected
to be under the influence only with an electronic warrant, patient
consent, or court order, which complies with HIPAA.209 The Utah
implied consent law states:
a person licensed to drive in the state of Utah is considered to have
given the person's consent to a chemical test or tests of the person's
breath, blood, urine, or oral fluids for the purpose of determining
whether the person was operating or in actual physical control of a
motor vehicle while . . . having a blood or breath alcohol content
statutorily prohibited.210

The police officer who arrested nurse Wubbles mistakenly
believed he was acting under the authority of this statute. 211 The
officer requested the blood draw in order to establish that the
patient was not under the influence at the time of the accident.212
However, the Utah implied consent statute permits a warrantless
blood draw only on the person suspected of driving under the
influence.213 Thus, the implied consent law did not authorize the
206. See id. at 150 (discussing the need for standards justifying health care
providers’ participation in blood draws requested by law enforcement).
207. Ko, supra note 120, at 505.
208. See Ko, supra note 120, at 510 (stating that many covered entities lack
the time, personnel, and technical expertise required to conduct their own
analyses).
209. Barbash & Hawkins, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
210. Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (2019).
211. See Paul Cassell, Cop Who Arrested Nurse Was Wrong, But the Law Is
Complicated, THE SALT LAKE TRIBUNE (Sept. 01, 2017), www.sltrib.com/
opinion/commentary/2017/09/01/paul-cassell-cop-who-arrested-nurse-waswrong-but-the-law-is-complicated (stating “[a]ccording to the police reports
connected with the incident, the detective and his supervisor thought they had
consent relying on Utah’s “implied consent” law found at Utah Code § 41-6a520”).
212. See Hawkins & Wang, supra note 1 (noting that the unconscious patient
was the victim of a car accident and the officer who demanded his blood
requested it to prove that the victim’s blood had no alcohol content).
213. Id.
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blood draw under these circumstances. 214 However, had the
unconscious patient been suspected of driving under the influence,
the nurse would have been wrong in refusing the blood draw
because the Utah implied consent law would have circumvented the
hospital’s policy.215 The arresting officer was wrong because he
mistakenly believed the Utah implied consent law granted him
authority to obtain the blood sample. 216
However, the circumstances would have been different if the
implied consent statute was not the authority for which the officer
based his request. The circumstances might have established a
“permitted disclosure” under the HIPAA as it applies to unconscious
patients suspected to be victims of a crime. 217 Thus, the law
enforcement officer could have based his request on HIPAA rather
than state law to obtain the blood draw and been successful. This
case demonstrates how the language of HIPAA and the preemption
provision can create confusion for both law enforcement and
medical personnel alike.

IV. PROPOSAL
The issue that arose in Utah, and the potential issues that will
transpire in North Carolina and Arizona under the aforementioned
statutes, exist because HIPAA as it is currently written is
ambiguous and implies that a state law or state action having the
force and effect of law action will preempt HIPAA. 218
214. Id.
215. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-520 (2019) (stating an officer may
direct medical personnel to administer blood draws where the officer has
reasonable grounds to believe that a person from whom blood is to be taken was
driving while having a blood alcohol content that was statutorily prohibited),
with Barbash & Hawkins, supra note 3 (stating that the University of Utah
Hospital’s policy stated police enforcement could obtain blood samples for
patients suspected to be under the influence only with an electronic warrant,
patient consent, or court order).
216. See Cassell, supra note 211 (concluding “Nurse Wubbels was ultimately
right – but for the wrong reasons. And the Salt Lake Police were ultimately
wrong – but could rightly point to an implied consent law as potentially being
in play”).
217. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(3)(i) (2019). Where the patient is someone who is
or suspected to be the victim of a crime, law enforcement and medical personnel
must obtain his consent. Id. If the patient is incapable of consenting, law
enforcement must establish three requirements: (1) that the information is
needed to determine whether someone other than the victim has violated the
law and that the information is not intended to be used against the victim; (2)
that waiting for the individual to consent would materially and adversely affect
law enforcement activity; and (3) that disclosure is in the best interests of the
individual as determined by the covered entity. Id.
218. See Peter H.W. Van Der Goes, Jr., Opportunity Lost: Why and How to
Improve the HHS-Proposed Legislation Governing Law Enforcement Access to
Medical Records, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 1009, 1048 (1999) (stating that “[e]xisting
legal protections afforded to individuals seeking to assert a privacy interest in
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This section will recommend several proposals as to how to
resolve this issue. Section A will discuss why the preemption
provision should remain partial. Section B will discuss why
Congress should further define the “more stringent” standard in
preemption analysis. Section C will propose how the phrase “as
required by law,” as stated in HIPAA, should be construed. Section
D will propose amendments to the language of the “permitted
disclosures.” Section E will address how the proposals will affect
state police power. Finally, Section F will describe that the exigent
circumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment will not be
affected by the proposed amendments.

A. HIPAA’s Partial Preemption Provision Should
Remain Partial
HIPAA should not completely preempt state law. Advocates for
complete preemption argue that HIPAA regulations should adopt
complete preemption of state law and constitute a single,
comprehensive source of law that supersedes all state laws affecting
the disclosure of protected health information. 219 They contend that
complete preemption would provide administrative ease and
efficiency, clarity, practicality, predictability, and uniformity. 220
However, complete preemption would permit the federal
government to completely usurp the traditional regulatory role of
the states because the enactment of HIPAA “inject[ed] the federal
government into an arena that had previously been primarily
occupied by the states.”221 Instead, a clearly delineated partial
their health records and prevent law enforcement intrusion are more disparate
than standardized, more ambiguous than defined, more conflicted than robust,
and more incomplete than comprehensive”); see also Sarah Beatty Ratner,
Articles: HIPAA’S Preemption Provision: Doomed Cooperative Federalism, Vol.
35, No. 4, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., 485, 523 (2002) (recognizing, “[t]he statutory
provisions of HIPAA provide little guidance as to the application and scope of
its preemption provision”).
219. See Rebecca H. Bishop, The Final Patient Privacy Regulations Under
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act - Promoting Patient
Privacy or Public Confusion?, 37 GA. L. REV. 723, 729 (2003) (asserting that the
"need for uniformity, efficiency, and protection of patients' medical records
serves as evidence that the best solution to the present HIPAA confusion is one
set of federal regulations that fully supplant state law").
220. See Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health
Information, 65 Fed. Reg. 82462, 82579 (2000) (stating that "numerous" public
comments rejected the partial preemption framework as burdensome,
ineffective, or insufficient, and called instead for complete preemption of
"patchwork" state laws); see also Cf. Sharon J. Hussong, Medical Records and
Your Privacy: Developing Federal Legislation to Protect Patient Privacy Rights,
26 AM. J.L. & MED. 453, 469 (2000) (noting "insurance companies claim that
federal preemption would ensure that they would not have to increase costs for
consumers").
221. Joy L. Pritts, Developments and Trends in the Law: Altered States: State
Health Privacy Laws and the Impact of the Federal Health Privacy Laws and
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framework should be implemented. A partial preemption
framework instead “attempts to balance the autonomy of the states
against the need for uniform national standards on medical privacy”
as partial preemption preserves the rights of the states to legislate
in this area by either changing existing laws or passing new, more
protective provisions.222 As such, the current partial preemption
framework should establish a clear, uniform, and streamlined
analytical framework for deciding which state laws preempt
HIPAA.

B. Congress Should Clarify the Term “More Stringent”
Congress should clarify the term “more stringent” as used in
45 C.F.R. § 160.202 because the standard does not provide covered
entities with concrete examples of what the term means. Under
HIPAA, a state law is "more stringent" if it meets at least one of six
enumerated criteria: (1) it prohibits use or disclosure of IIHI under
circumstances where HIPAA would permit it; (2) it provides
patients of IIHI with "greater rights of access or amendment" to
their information; (3) it provides a "greater amount of information"
to patients about use, disclosure, rights, or remedies; (4) it provides
requirements that narrow the scope or duration, increase the
privacy protections afforded, or reduce the coercive effect of the
circumstances surrounding the need for express legal permission
with respect to the form, substance, or need for legal permission
prior to a use or disclosure; (5) it provides for more detailed
recordkeeping or accounting of disclosures; or (6) "with respect to
any other matter, [it] provides greater privacy protection" for the
subject of the information.223
This standard creates a subjective and confusing framework
for medical entities to employ when evaluating preemption.
Congress should provide clarity as to the meaning of "greater rights
of access or amendment," “greater amount of information” and
“greater privacy protection” by providing specific examples of each.
Doing so would provide medical entities with concrete examples
which they can refer to in evaluating relevant statutory provisions
that are “contrary” to HIPAA provisions.

C. Statutory Construction of “As Required by Law”
The phrase “as required by law” within the HIPAA “permitted
disclosures” should be narrowly construed. HIPAA provision 45
C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) delineates when disclosures are permitted

the Impact of the Federal Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 325, 340 (2002).
222. Ko, supra note 120, at 523.
223. Ko, supra note 120, at 504-05; 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
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pursuant to process or otherwise “required by law.”224 The first
subsection225 states that a covered entity may disclose protected
health information “as required by law including laws that require
the reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical
injuries.”226 However, the term “as required by law” is not defined
within the text of the provision. The preemption provision defines
“state law” as any “constitution, statute, regulation, rule, common
law, or other State action having the force and effect of law.”227
Thus, a broad interpretation of 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) would infer
that the text refers to any state law. Under this interpretation, any
state law, including an implied consent law, which mandates the
disclosure of IHII would fall within this provision and medical
personnel would be required to oblige.
However, given that HIPAA was enacted in response to the
states’ inconsistent and incomplete regulations in relation to IIHI,
it would seem that such a broad interpretation would directly
undermine the goals of the act.228 Moreover, if this broad
interpretation was correct, then the provision would suffice by
merely stating, “as required by law,” because the first clause would
encompass the second clause which refers to laws that mandate
reporting of specific injuries.
A more precise construction of the statute should interpret the
provision in the context of its surrounding language, which is a
method employed by the Supreme Court in statutory construction
cases.229 The phrase, “as required by law including laws that require
the reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical
injuries,”230 should be construed as merely referring to laws that
require the reporting of certain types of wounds or injuries. This is
because the preemption provision expressly provides the framework
for preemption analysis and as a preliminary determination, the
state law must “relate to” the privacy of IHII.231 If the provision was
to be interpreted as encompassing any state law, there would be no
need to employ the preemption analysis. Rather, any state law that
requires medical entities to disclose IIHI would fall into this
“permitted disclosure” provision of the Privacy Rule.
Instead, all state laws “relating to” the disclosure of IHII that
do not fall within the very limited “permitted disclosure” provisions
224. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1) (2019).
225. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019).
226. Id (emphasis added).
227. 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2019).
228. E.g., 64 Fed. Reg. 59919 (1999).
229. United Savings Ass'n of Texas v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates,
484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (stating that “[a] provision that may seem ambiguous
in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory scheme -- because
the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its meaning
clear”).
230. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019) (emphasis added).
231. Ko, supra note 120, at 504; 45 C.F.R. § 160.203 (2019).
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of HIPAA must be analyzed to determine whether HIPAA preempts
the state law.

D. Proposed Text for 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.
HIPAA should be amended to remove the ambiguity 232
regarding the legislature’s authority to permit disclosures of
protected health information outside of the disclosures described
and outlined in HIPAA provision 45 C.F.R. § 164.512.233 The
preemption language found in 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 should be
restated in the “permitted disclosures” section of the act in order to
clarify which “laws” should be considered in the preemption
analysis. The first standard 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a): Uses and
disclosures required by law,234 should include a definition for the
phrase “required by law.” The definition should read:
“required by law” as defined by this provision requires that the state
law permitting disclosure of individually identifiable health
information without patient authorization or patient opportunity to
consent or object to disclosure applies only to state laws that provide
more protection of privacy of patient’s individually identifiable health
information than the protection afforded within HIPAA regulation.235

Doing so would remove any confusion as to what “required by
law” means within the provision. As a result, 45 C.F.R. §
164.512(a)(2) would logically follow: “(2) [a] covered entity must
meet the requirements described in paragraph (c), (e), or (f) of this
section for uses or disclosures required by law.”236
Making this subtle change would establish that the “laws”
referred to in the “permitted disclosure” provisions are only those
listed in paragraph (c), (e), or (f) and would not allow for the
misinterpretation that “any” state law or action could mandate
disclosures otherwise prohibited under HIPAA. Instead, any state
action or statute would have to survive a proper preemption
analysis.
Further, 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i), the “permitted disclosure”
stating that a covered entity may disclose protected health
information “as required by law including laws that require the
reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries,” 237
should be amended to state, “as required by laws which require the
reporting of certain types of wounds or other physical injuries.” 238
232. See Ko, supra note 120, at 513 (stating “[a] major obstacle to
interpreting and applying HIPAA's preemption provision is that much of its
language is ambiguous and indefinite”).
233. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019).
234. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019).
235. 45 C.F.R. § 160.201-05 (2019).
236. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a)(2) (2019).
237. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019) (emphasis added).
238. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f)(1)(i) (2019).
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In addition, the text should provide general examples of the types
of laws the provision refers to such as laws requiring disclosure of
gun-shot wounds. This would limit the statutes that do not preempt
HIPAA as a matter of law and allow for a proper preemption
analysis.
These changes would adequately inform medical entities and
law enforcement of the circumstances when HIPAA allows for the
disclosure of IHII for law enforcement purposes because the
“permitted disclosures” would be clearly articulated in the HIPAA
provisions.239 As such, the burden medical entities face in
preemption analysis when drafting policies or responding to law
enforcement’s requests for blood draws would be substantially
decreased because there would be no question as to whether the
state action or statute falls clearly within a “permitted disclosure.”
Finally, medical entities would not be uncertain as to whether they
are violating HIPAA where compliance conflicts with law
enforcement needs and goals.

E. Amending HIPAA Will Not Take Power Away from
State Law
In enacting HIPAA, Congress mandated the establishment of
federal standards for the security of protected health information. 240
The purpose of the Privacy Rule is to ensure that every covered
entity has implemented safeguards to protect the confidentiality,
integrity, and availability of protected health information. 241
HIPAA compliance is very serious for covered entities, and
oftentimes, medical personnel are hesitant to disclose information
to law enforcement because of the threat of a HIPAA violation. 242
Leaving the disclosures to the discretion of HIPAA would grant
239. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019) (stating that under HIPAA, such
disclosures are permitted for victims of abuse, neglect, or domestic violence,
disclosures for judicial and administrative proceedings, and disclosures for law
enforcement purposes). Law enforcement purposes include disclosures
pursuant to process, disclosures that are limited for identification and location
purposes, disclosures for victims of a crime, disclosures of decedents in the event
that their death may have resulted from criminal conduct, disclosures for crime
on the premises of the covered entity and disclosures for reporting crime in
emergencies. Id.
240. 45 C.F.R. § 164.501 (2019).
241. Id.
242. Tomes & McCart, supra note 115 (stating that:
[w]hat makes HIPAA difficult for law enforcement are these HIPAA
criminal and civil penalties, which scare the you-know-what out of those
in the health care industry, thinking that, if they disclose PHI in
violation of HIPAA’s somewhat incomprehensible rules, they are going
straight to HIPAA jail or will be hit with a seven-figure HIPAA civil
money penalty, what DHHS calls a fine).
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medical personnel peace of mind and deter resistance against law
enforcement when requests for blood draws arise.
The states’ police power will not be infringed upon in making
these proposed amendments. This is because the proposed language
already exists within the HIPAA and does not impact the state’s
ability to legislate or exercise its police powers. Rather, the burden
placed on law enforcement to obtain the medical records of blood
alcohol content through blood draws would become less perplexing
because HIPAA clearly states the twelve permitted disclosures
where law enforcement can obtain the information without a
warrant in compliance with both the hospital policy and recent
Supreme Court decisions. Put another way, law enforcement will no
longer have to analyze applicable state law and present it alongside
a compelling argument to hospital personnel in order to obtain the
blood sample because there would be a uniform set of guidelines
that both sides would be fully aware of.

F. Overcoming the Exigent Circumstance Exception
This proposal would be in compliance with case law as it stands
in regard to the exigent circumstance exception to the warrant
requirement. After the Supreme Court’s ruling in McNeely, it is
clear that the dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream alone cannot
create a categorical exigent circumstances exception. 243
However, there is still concern over the “exigent
circumstances” exception. The Supreme Court in Birchfield noted
that in addition to consent, there are still two kinds of exceptions to
the warrant requirement: “(1) case-by-case exceptions, where the
particularities of an individual case justify a warrantless search in
that instance, but not others; and (2) categorical exceptions, where
the commonalities among a class of cases justify dispensing with the
warrant requirement for all of those cases, regardless of their
individual circumstances.”244 The argument against amending
HIPAA is that such exceptions would no longer be grounds upon
which law enforcement could base warrantless disclosure requests.
However, the aforementioned HIPAA provisions for “permitted
243. McNeely, 569 U.S. at 158 (“While the desire for a bright-line rule is
understandable, the Fourth Amendment will not tolerate adoption of an overly
broad categorical approach that would dilute the warrant requirement in a
context where significant privacy interests are at stake.”).
244. Compare Birchfield, 136 S. Ct. 2160 at 2188 (stating that “the Court
allows warrantless searches on a case-by-case basis where the exigencies of the
particular case make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a
warrantless search is objectively reasonable” in that instance) (internal
quotations omitted), with McNeely, 569 U.S. 141 at 168 (stating that “[t]he
defining feature of the exigent circumstances exception is that the need for the
search becomes clear only after all of the facts and circumstances of the
particular case have been considered in light of the totality of the
circumstances”); and 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019).
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disclosures” are detailed and provide multiple scenarios where law
enforcement can bypass the need for a warrant. 245

V.

CONCLUSION

The issue regarding blood draws and disclosure of protected
information affects both the legal field and the medical field in
substantial ways. Medical personnel must protect patient privacy
while law enforcement must deter drunk driving. The Supreme
Court has attempted for nearly sixty-six years since Rochin to draw
the line between the public interests being served by the state police
power and the individual rights afforded to every citizen by the
United States Constitution.
HIPAA provides detailed standards that fulfill exceptions to
the warrant requirement which assist law enforcement interests in
deterring drunk driving and comply with recent case law.246
It is clear that HIPAA, as currently drafted, lacks the
necessary language to carry out its policy; however, it should be
amended in order to do so. Medical personnel in states such as
North Carolina and Arizona should not be compelled to draw blood
on a patient for law enforcement purposes simply because a law
officer directs them to.247 Nor should a nurse be arrested in the
emergency room of a hospital for refusing to draw blood for a police
officer who is unsure of the state’s laws on implied consent.248 State
governments, whether through implied consent laws, or other
statutes, should not be able to permit law enforcement to
circumvent the requirements of HIPAA by enacting contradictory
or confusing state law. Nor should the provisions of HIPAA be
loosely construed to afford state legislatures more power than the
act permits.

245. See generally 45 C.F.R. § 164.512 (2019) (stating that “disclosures are
permitted: (1) if pursuant to process and as otherwise required by law; (2) for
the limited purpose of identification and location; (3) for an individual who is
or suspected to be the victim of a crime; (4) for decedents for the purpose of
alerting law enforcement of the death of the individual; (5) for crimes on the
premises of the covered entity; and (6) for the purpose of reporting crime in
emergencies”).
246. 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(a) (2019); 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(f) (2019).
247. North Carolina General Statute § 20-139.1(c).
248. See Hawkins and Wang, supra note 1 (commenting on the videotaped
arrest of a nurse at a Salt Lake City hospital after she told police that they
weren’t allowed to draw blood from an unconscious patient).
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